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Abstract The neutral architecture of the Internet is being challenged by various
parties, such as network operators providing the connections to end-users, who are
interested in gaining control of the information exchanged over the Internet. What
are the effects on competition and welfare of such practices? Currently, there exists
very little economic theory on network neutrality. This paper provides a preliminary
analysis of the type of economic modeling that can address network neutrality, as
well as of the type of results that can be expected.
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1 Introduction
Users of the Internet benefit from a stream of continuously emerging innovations in
applications and services. These innovations give rise to a need for faster and more
precise data transmission, which require investments and innovations by network
operators. Certain innovations, such as Quality of Service (QoS) and the labeling of
individual data packets (packet shaping), help operators to raise the priority of a
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certain data flow or limit the priority of another flow. Such technologies may support
the provision of applications that are time-sensitive (e.g. voice), or that require high-
bandwidth (e.g. video) or a higher level of security (e.g. e-commerce).
The Internet as we currently know it is based on a simple network architecture1,
which allows any computer to send packets to any other computer, while packets are
not inspected by the networks. As a result, all packets are treated in the same way,
and literally anyone is able to build, implement and introduce (possibly as
commercial services) new Web applications, without having to ask any party, such
as an ISP or network operator, for permission. Of course, users typically have to pay
for connections to the Internet, and the price they pay may depend on speed or
quality. Nevertheless, network operators do not act as selective gatekeepers, and
service providers do not pay network operators or ISPs to get exclusive access to
particular users. Thus, the Internet, as it is based on freedom of connection with any
application or service, and to any party, can therefore be seen as a neutral
communications medium; it is characterized by “network neutrality.”2,3
The neutral architecture of the Internet is being challenged by various parties, such as
network operators providing the connections to end-users, who are strongly interested in
gaining control of the information exchanged over the Internet. Such control would give
them the possibility, for instance, to charge different prices for different types of
information carried over their networks, to differentiate between QoS for different
applications, and to block certain applications from their networks. Potentially, the impact
on competition and the value derived by consumers of such behavior may be very large.
To some extent, differentiation based on QoS has already been implemented
within IP-based networks, and at some point it could become a successor of the
current “best effort” routing practice. Under QoS and demand-based discrimination
in case of congestion, packets are treated on a first-in/first-out basis; but if
congestion occurs, packets with less value drop out first. Currently, however, the
Internet exhibits excess capacity4; yet a packet might be dropped out from the data
flow according to a network operator’s preferences, leading to discrimination in the
data transmission. This form of discrimination has led to a heated debate on
“network neutrality,” particularly in the USA.5 This debate is now gaining
prominence in Europe as well.6
1 Based on certain protocols (known as TCP and IP).
2 This description is based on the weblog of Tim Berners-Lee, one of the inventors of the Web, 21 June
2006, http://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/taxonomy/term/23.
3 See van der Berg (2006) for a very useful overview of network neutrality discussion (in Dutch).
6 For example, CRN Workshop: “Net Neutrality—Battle for a New World Order or Much Ado About
Nothing?,” 11 December 2006, London, http://www.cambridge-mit.org/events/article/default.aspx?
objid=8.
5 See e.g. US Senate Committee Hearing on network neutrality, 7 February 2006, http://commerce.senate.
gov/hearings/witnesslist.cfm?id=1705; a debate between C. Yoo and T. Wu, May 2006, http://legalaffairs.
org/webexclusive/debateclub_net-neutrality0506.msp; a discussion between S. Crawford and C. Yoo,
February 2006, http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/222/net-rules.html; the Quello Communication Law and
Policy Symposium on 6 April 2006: http://www.quello.msu.edu/2006/schedule.htm; FTC workshop on
“Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy”, 13–14 February 2007, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/
broadband/index.html.
4 Prüfer and Jahn (2007).
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There does not exist a precise definition of network neutrality—the concept is
largely based on the four “Internet Freedoms” formulated by Michael Powell, then
chairman of the FCC, to conclude a discussion on the 1996 US Telecommunications
Act7: consumers should be able to have access to lawful Internet content, to run
applications and services of their choice, to attach devices to their connection, and to
receive transparent information regarding network operators. The general idea is that
the Internet should be operated under non-discrimination and should protect
interconnection and end-to-end connectivity. Thus, all packets transmitted over the
network are treated the same way by the networks, including the traffic originating
within the network operator. This approach was expressed in the latest proposal for
amendment, voted out by the US House on 8 June 2006.8
The main questions in the debate on network neutrality relate to the private
incentives and the social costs and benefits caused by active packet shaping: how is
competition affected? How are consumer choice and consumers surplus affected?
How are the incentives to invest and innovate—in networks as well as applications
and services—affected? The first two questions are particularly relevant for short
term, the latter one for long term welfare.
There are a few reasons that make the discussion more complicated: one can
witness very fast technological development and also changes in the business models
of Internet-based firms. At the moment nobody can predict how the next generation
network will function, and according to participants in the discussion, the market
should sort out the outcome. Besides, from the subscriber-based characteristics of
telecommunications networks, a shift can be observed toward a model relying on
tailor-made advertisements and thereby potentially rearranging the structure of
revenues gained in the broadband market.
In the current debate on network neutrality, two main streams of reasoning can be
distinguished. According to proponents of network neutrality, the Internet should
remain a neutral network, and according to some, the notion of network neutrality
should find its way into the law.9 They argue that without network neutrality, end-
users will get less choice, because investments and innovations by developers of
applications and services that run over the Internet will be stifled. According to this
view, the currently witnessed success of the Internet is due to innovations at the
“edges” of the network rather than in the “core.” Here, the core refers to intelligence
inside of the network, while the edges correspond to functionality that end-users can
implement themselves. The Internet should remain a commodity in the form of a
“stupid network,” providing capacity, interconnectivity and speed.10 As a result, the
separation between the transport and application layers will remain intact, allowing
for complete freedom by independent parties to develop innovations that run over
the Internet.
7 Powell (2004). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_neutrality for an overview of definitions.
8 See Markey (2006). A new, called Snowe–Dorgan amendment is currently waiting for US house vote:
http://static.publicknowledge.org/pdf/ina-staff-draft-20060404.pdf.
9 Proponents are e.g. Lessig (2006), Wu (2005), Frieden (2006), Crawford (2007), and Berners-Lee
(2007).
10 The definition originates from David Isenberg’s online post from 1997 at http://isen.com/stupid.html.
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Among the opponents of network neutrality, some are fundamentally opposed to
network neutrality regulation, which they view as interfering by the government in
the way firms wish to do business. Others claim that network operators must be able
to introduce different pricing structures in order to allow them to recoup investments
in networks. They argue that without the possibility to do so—that is, in the presence
of price regulation—their incentives to invest and innovate will be undermined.11
According to the latter view, the future success of the Internet depends on
innovations at the “core” of the network rather than at the “edges,” because of the
interdependence and complementary relationship between network and application.
For the same reason, it is argued that a network operator has no incentives to
discriminate unduly in the long term anyway, at least not if there are competing
networks that end-users can choose from. The best a regulator can do is therefore to
intensify competition at the level of infrastructure. Nevertheless, they agree that if
consumers cannot choose between networks, antitrust authorities will ultimately
punish anticompetitive behavior, so that it will not occur in the first place. Overall, a
likely outcome of abandoning the neutral nature of the Internet is that the transport
and application layers will become integrated, reducing the freedom of independent
parties that use the Internet.
Regulatory authorities, such as Ofcom in the UK and FCC or FTC in the USA,
and international organizations, like OECD12 have recently started to actively
participate in the discussion. At present they share the view that regulatory
intervention should remain minimal and limited to ex post intervention in case of
anticompetitive practices. However intensifying competition and providing trans-
parency for the benefit of consumers are still a few of the most important policy
goals which can be supported by ex ante regulation.
Currently, there exists very little economic theory on network neutrality. In this
paper, we provide an outline of the type of economic modeling that can address
network neutrality, as well as of the type of results that can be expected. In our
argument we mainly focus on access-tiering in the presence of facilities-based
competition and horizontal differentiation, in which setup this practice has not been
presented yet. In addition, this paper relates some basic economic arguments to a
situation characterized by competition between a DSL network and a cable network.
The latter characteristic is relevant since it is sometimes claimed that as long as
consumers can choose between networks, they can always switch if they do not like
operators initiatives to reduce network neutrality (we will come back to this claim in
the body of the paper).
We rely on standard insights from the theory of industrial organization (Tirole
1988); the economics of network industries (Shy 2002); and research on the
economics of sabotage in vertically integrated market (Mandy and Sappington 2004;
Sappington and Weisman 2005). There exist some economics papers on network
neutrality, for instance van Schewick (2007), Ford et al. (2006), and Hahn and
Wallsten (2006), although they use little or no economic modeling.
The closest paper to our conclusions is written by van Schewick who argues that
in a duopoly situation, network operators have incentives to discriminate, which
11 Opponents include Litan and Singer (2007), Sidak (2006), Waverman (2006) and Yoo (2005).
12 See e.g. CRN Workshop in footnote 6.
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leads to exclusion of applications and content providers and thus to lack of
innovations in that level; she therefore recommends network neutrality regulation.
On the other hand she claims the costs of regulation—the decreasing incentives to
invest in networks—are outweighed by the benefits from application-level
innovation. One of the main differences from our paper is relating to this point.
By assessing network-level investment in a setup which distinguishes the effects of
horizontal differentiation from rent capturing, our welfare analysis shows that overall
welfare will not necessarily decrease: even in the presence of discriminatory
practices long-term welfare can increase. Another difference is that van Schewick
focuses mainly on mandating network neutrality via the law. We discuss, in addition,
already existing policy tools which may be sufficiently effective.
Emphasizing more the impact of network operators on welfare, Ford et al. (2006)
argue that network neutrality regulation discourages entry in the sense that it reduces
horizontal product differentiation, which is important for profitability and also
investments. However they point out that product differentiation is undesirable for
short-term welfare since it increases prices and decreases consumers’ choice.
Although Hahn and Wallsten (2006) stand for a rather “hands-off” approach, they
agree with network neutrality proponents that exclusion may occur which will harm
consumers, however they claim that net neutrality regulation which they consider as
a type of price regulation, would also harm welfare. Besides they trust in the multi-
sided nature of the market that is due to network effects: the more consumers are
subscribed, the more versatile content will survive. As a result, network operators
still have incentives to transfer a wide range of content. Instead of network neutrality
regulation, they suggest that policy should focus on reducing entry barriers:
eliminating restrictions of the use of spectrum on the one hand, and on the other
hand not determining who is entitled to enter the market and how it can use the
infrastructure. Nevertheless the government has to continue to play an important role
in antitrust enforcement if the market performs in an anticompetitive way.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces potential
discriminatory practices and provides a short overview of the institutional
background in the EU as it relates to network neutrality. Section 3 introduces the
framework we will use to explore network neutrality from an economics viewpoint.
Using this framework, the most relevant discriminating practices are then analyzed.
Access-tiering receives special attention. Finally Section 4 contains some prelimi-
nary policy recommendations, and briefly comments on the situation in the
Netherlands.
2 Background
This section provides some background information on network neutrality and the
legal framework in the EU. For the sake of brevity, we will not discuss recent
developments in the broadband market.13
13 For a recent overview of developments in broadband, see de Bijl and Peitz (2006).
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2.1 Practices that violate network neutrality
The main types of behavior that violate network neutrality are the following:
1. Port blocking and quality degradation: Using new technologies, a network
owner is able to block access to or deliberately degrade the quality of data
transmission from a web site providing applications, services or content. In an
extreme case both operators may block part of the Internet for some end-users.
In practice port blocking has already occurred, particularly relating to voice over
Internet protocol (VoIP) services.14
2. Access-tiering: A network operator may discriminate in a way that it gives
bandwidth priority at a price independent from Internet access fees to
application, service and content providers that are willing to pay for quality of
services. Network operators may auction off or sell lanes to application and
service providers in order to capture rents from their producer surplus.
In addition, due to its discriminating characteristic, “consumer-tiering” is
sometimes viewed to violate network neutrality. A network operator may offer
different types of access contracts, based on differences in speed and volume, and
sell them at different prices according to consumers’ willingness to pay. However,
we view this practice as an example of price discrimination when a consumer
decides which package to choose and pays according to her preferences, similar to,
for instance, the availability of different types of contracts in mobile telephony.
Therefore consumer-tiering does not seem to be controversial in the current debate
on network neutrality.
2.2 Institutional background
It is beyond the scope of this paper to make recommendations on the optimal way of
implementing network neutrality, but it is nevertheless worthwhile to point out some
legal issues. In legal terms, on the basis of the EU regulatory framework for
electronic communications, network neutrality could conceivably be implemented
via different routes.
Firstly, in the European Union, the wholesale broadband access market falls under
the significant market power (SMP) regime regulated in the Access Directive.15 It is
not clear whether this market definition adequately covers the problem. If it were so,
then operators with SMP on this market could face certain obligations (in principle
to be taken from the list of Articles 9 to 13 of the Access Directive), including non-
discrimination and/or access at regulated prices. In any event, the cluster of issues
grouped under “network neutrality” would have to be broken down into specific
obligations for that purpose.
14 For an example in the US context, see the decision in the Madison River case which passed in March
2005 at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf. A European example
concerns the announcement by Vodafone Germany (July 2005) to block Skype services via its 3G
network from July 2007, see e.g. http://www.ovum.com/go/content/c,57072.
15 “Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to,
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities”, Official Journal of
the European Communities, L 108/7.
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Secondly, in the Access Directive in Article 4 and 5, interconnection and
interoperability have been set as principles, however no other specific enforceable
regulation for interconnection and interoperability exist. Interconnection is based
on negotiation, and the outcome depends on the bargaining power between the
participants. Some issues falling under “network neutrality” could perhaps be dealt
with under this heading. However, the power of the national regulatory authorities
(NRAs) is limited, and furthermore, the precise scope of application of these
provisions remains controversial. From responses to the call for input of the
Commission for the review of the regulatory framework16, it can be seen that for
some interested parties (e.g. from the UK and The Netherlands), interoperability
and end-to-end connectivity should continue to be objectives and be guaranteed
which calls for reconsidering the role of NRAs. Moreover any regulation imposed
should not impede further investments. Arguably, freedom of contract should be
retained and regulatory intervention should be undertaken only in case of
anticompetitive behavior, of course unless ex ante intervention is more efficient
than ex post dealing it.
Thirdly, network neutrality could also be implemented via stand-alone legislative
provisions. The current European regulatory framework is now under review and
could perhaps be augmented with such specific provisions. This solution may be
easier on the legal side, but a political agreement at Member State level is necessary
to effect such a change. Note that including network neutrality via specific
provisions would run against the grain of the current regulatory framework, which
rather tries to address such issues via regulatory procedures using more general
concepts, such as SMP.17
3 A simple economic analysis of network neutrality
3.1 Starting point and assumptions
The starting point for our analysis will be a hypothetical situation in which:
1. There is network neutrality (this corresponds to the Internet as we currently
know it),
2. There is effective competition between a small number of network operators
(this may depend on the presence of network neutrality, as we will later see).
To a certain extent, the situation in some European countries, for instance in The
Netherlands, may (soon) correspond to this starting point. This country has the
second largest broadband penetration in the world and also in the EU (31.8% in
December 2006), while both the incumbent telecoms operator (KPN) as well as a
small number of regional cable monopolist with an overall nationwide coverage are
16 See at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/info_centre/documentation/public_consult/
review/index_en.htm.
17 Larouche (2000) in Chapter 4.I.A.2 points out similar gaps in the competition law instancing the
discussion already burst over intelligent versus stupid networks as they are described by Isenberg (1997).
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able to offer triple play bundles.18 Thus there is facilities-based competition. In
addition, due to regulation of local loop unbundling, there are various entrants who
use KPN’s local networks for access to end-users to offer Internet access based on
DSL (Digital Subscriber Line), ensuring intensive service-based competition. Other
technologies, such as fiber to the home (FTTH) provided by municipalities and
wireless networks (WiFi, WLL and UMTS) also exist in the Dutch market, but their
coverage is limited compared to the previous ones.19
When we talk about network operators, we include companies with their own
infrastructure (network owners) and Internet service providers (ISPs) that use this
infrastructure.20 Besides there exists a market for applications and services that run
on that infrastructure (see Fig. 1). We will refer to the first market as networks level
and the second as applications (or services) level. Note that the latter includes
“plain” broadband access as a service in itself. End-users are the users of
applications and services and can be consumers and producers as well, both are
paying fees for having Internet access.
By looking what happens if network neutrality is abandoned in various ways, we
will consider what happens to the effectiveness of competition and to welfare.
To evaluate the emerging situations from a policy perspective, we follow the
approach developed in Bennett et al. (2001).21 By using their framework one can
analyze, in a consistent and systematical way, “future” policy issues related to certain
market developments. By viewing certain developments as a course of events with a
momentum of their own (e.g. technological developments events with certain aspects
that are beyond the control of policy and regulatory instruments), one can think
through the potential effects of policy within a well-defined context.
The framework is characterized by an economist’s approach to reduce market
failure in order to increase welfare. The underlying idea is that policy and regulation
may be used, for instance, to move the market to a better efficiency state (that is,
with higher static and dynamic efficiency), or to prevent the market from moving to
an undesirable efficiency state (with low static and dynamic efficiency). This
approach abstracts from considerations related to redistribution, politics, and social
goals not directly linked to maximizing social surplus.
To keep the analysis brief, some shortcuts will be taken compared to the approach
by Bennett et al. During the analysis we will judge market outcomes and policy
interventions by the criteria of static and dynamic efficiency. Higher static efficiency
arises from an improved allocation of inputs by using existing technologies, while
higher dynamic efficiency comes from investments in process innovation in order to
lower costs of service provision (in telecoms this is typically done by investing in
new types of equipment and infrastructure) and product innovation to provide new
18 Triple play: a bundle of voice service, TV and Internet access.
19 See OECD Broadband Statistics, December 2006, accessible at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband
and OPTA Annual Report 2005, accessible at http://www.opta.nl.
20 To simplify the analysis, we treat local loop unbundling and bitstream access on the same level as the
network owners. In a more detailed analysis, one should distinguish between network operators and
entrants who use unbundled access as a means to reach end-users.
21 de Bijl (2004) contains an accessible summary, which is useful for readers who are unfamiliar with this
approach.
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and improved services (or higher speed) representing higher consumers value, both
leading therefore to innovations that are welfare-increasing. All this is valid to the
extent that such investments are not wasteful but lead to higher total surplus. Thus,
static efficiency is a short-run welfare notion, and dynamic efficiency a long-run one.
Outcomes that maximize dynamic efficiency at the expense of (short-run) efficiency
generally outperform—in terms of the aggregate of per period welfare levels in the long
run—the outcomes that maximize static efficiency at the expense of dynamic efficiency.
Potential tradeoffs between static and dynamic efficiency may not be straightforward to
assess, though. Consider for instance investments in additional networks. They may
lead to more competition in quality of services (e.g. because of higher-speed networks
that allow for additional functionality), but also to wasteful duplication.
To assess dynamic and static efficiency in a clear-cut setup, we will use three
assumptions:
1. Application innovations at the edges are more important for dynamic efficiency
than centralized innovations within networks.
2. Facilities-based competition at the networks level is characterized by a small
number of networks, while more competition increases dynamic efficiency.
3. Network providers have incentives to horizontally differentiate their networks.
These assumptions are not purely hypothetical, as they are supported by empirical
or theoretical considerations, which will be discuss below.
3.1.1 Decentralized investments at the applications level
It is important to make a distinction between on the one hand, innovation at the level
of applications, content and services that run over the Internet, and on the other
hand, the infrastructure. This distinction is relevant because of diverging incentives
to invest. Upgrading network pipes is clearly focused on increasing speed, capacity,
and reliability, so that the innovation process aiming at these goals can in a relatively
straightforward way be organized within an organization with some level of central
control. However, although one can organize applications innovation processes in a
similar way, one would miss the wealth of information coming from experimentation
and play by individuals and users who are not constrained by firm-specific goals.
DSL network Cable network 








Fig. 1 Illustration of market participants
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According to Odlyzko (2004), one of the misleading myths in the telecoms sector is
that networks are able to develop innovative services. Although networks have been
very innovative in improving their transport technologies, virtually all “killer
applications” running over the networks have come from users of their networks and
not from the carriers themselves.22 Odlyzko and also Berners-Lee (2007) argue that,
because of convergence, the fraction of innovations coming from users at the edges
of the networks will increase even further. In any case there is no reason to suspect
that network operators can easily turn this into their core business, let alone at a level
comparable of innovation generated through decentralized processes.23
Somewhat more generally, as one of the Internet’s central features is user
connectivity, it is this particular feature that will stimulate (decentralized) innovation
more and more. This point is elaborated by von Hippel (2005), who discusses a wide
variety of qualitative and empirical evidence behind the trend that new computer and
communications technologies help users (both firms and individuals) to innovate by
developing their own applications.24 The innovation processes benefit a lot from the
increased ability to share information and knowledge among users.25 It is exactly
this type of innovation—bottom-up, decentralized and fragmented, aided by the
enormous communication power of the Internet—that generates the largest number
of ideas, as it is users who do the experimentation and subsequent filtering of ideas
themselves. In addition, we observe that not only the process, but often the
application itself is becoming more and more decentralized: the connectivity of the
Internet leads to a growing variety of peer-to-peer applications that run on end-users’
PCs.
A final point worth mentioning is that small-scale, user-driven innovation may
fulfill needs in the tiniest market niches26, since there is no tendency to aim at the
largest common denominator among consumers. Overall, it seems safe to conclude
that the gains for dynamic efficiency in applications and services, stemming from
bottom-up processes among users, will be substantially larger, if not of a larger order
of magnitude, than in the case of innovation that is centrally controlled.
3.1.2 Small number of firms: investments at the networks level
Another important point in the network neutrality discussion is whether the network
owners have enough incentives to invest in their infrastructure. When we talk about
investment at the networks level, we can mention on the one hand upgrading and
maintenance of the existing networks, and on the other hand rolling out a new one.
22 Let us also mention, that investments also take place in applications which have already existed in the
market. For simplicity we will call them comparable services. These investments, mainly aimed at
upgrading and maintenance, are generated by larger application providers and network operators.
23 Of course there are situations in which centralized planning is superior to decentralized decision-
making, but this is most likely not the case in situations with a lot of technological change and uncertainty.
See Wu (2006), who discusses the relative efficiency of polyarchies and hierarchies as decision-making
models.
24 Benkler (2006) makes similar points in a broader setting when discussing peer production, sharing, and
“social production.”
25 See Wu (2006) for more references on decentralized innovation processes.
26 See Anderson (2004) and his notion of the “long tail.”
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The first group of investments is carried out by wired telecommunications (in DSL
technology) or cable companies, and the second group, newly emerging technologies
such as WiFi, satellite, FTTX technologies (e.g. fiber to the home—FTTH, fiber to
the building—FTTB or fiber to the node—FTTN) or power lines communications
are being established by—beside the previously mention operators—wireless
telecoms and satellite companies, municipalities or other utilities.
To assess the welfare relating to the networks level, potential tradeoffs between
static and dynamic efficiency will be taken into account by adopting the “inverse
U-shaped” relationship between the intensity of competition and dynamic efficiency
(see Fig. 2, based on the work of Aghion et al. 2005). Generally, in case of a
monopoly, the firm is not threatened by a competitive fringe potentially entering the
market, therefore it has less incentive to invest and innovate. In case of cut-throat
pricing competition, firms cannot gain supranormal profit—that is the revenue above
variable costs—to invest or to recoup investments. In between these two extreme
market situations there is a particular level of competition which leads to maximum
dynamic efficiency.
In the broadband infrastructure market one can observed a certain level of
facilities-based competition where the number of network operators owning their
facilities is small, stands generally around two to four, depending on the incidence of
alternative technologies. Although governments may have incentives to spur
competition in order to support the spread of broadband penetration, the number
of facilities-based companies will predictably not increase substantially due to the
high entry costs and the economies of scale. Besides, empirical studies, for instance
Wallsten (2006) and Distaso et al. (2006), show that interplatform competition has a
strong impact on broadband adoption and also on investments at the networks level.
So far the stronger the competition has been, the more the network owners invested
in connection speed. Based on these facts we claim that current level of competition
is located in the left-hand part of the inverse U-shaped curve that is with the
increasing relationship between competition and long-term welfare effects. Later in





Increasing relation Decreasing relation 
Fig. 2 Relationship between competition and dynamic efficiency
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3.1.3 Incentives for tiering and horizontally differentiating networks
The Internet as it is currently functioning can be seen as open, mainly responsible
for data transmission, therefore provides equal opportunity to appearance of all
kinds of applications, and is therefore not tuned for special types of data flow. Due
to this characteristic, the Internet platforms are called “stupid” networks or as
commodities.
By keeping the networks commoditized, network operators may only be able to
charge modest mark-ups, thus eroding the profit margin, which is against their long-
term interest. Contrarily, they may have incentives to “decommoditize” their
infrastructure and operate them as smart networks where particular data packages
are transmitted through the platforms differently on the basis of assigned priorities.27
Network owners can therefore attach prices to the priorities, engaging in different
kinds of tiering practices (see earlier consumer- and access-tiering).
One of the root causes of the network neutrality discussion was the statement of
Ed Whitacre, CEO of AT&T when he openly expressed the will to discriminate.28
Since then other telecoms have given voice to similar opinions in the news (see
Crawford 2007, and other examples29).
Besides these anecdotal sayings of leading market players about their intention to
tier, theoretical evidences can also be found behind networks’ incentive to
differentiate themselves from each other. According to Farrell and Weiser
(2003)30, a network operator is interested in vertical control of the application
market when it wants to be engaged in price discrimination. By setting different
prices for a bundle of the platform and particular applications, it can customize its
offer to the buyers, separating those consumers who are willing to pay more
(inframarginal consumers) from those who would switch for a price increase
(marginal consumers). In case of consumers as end-users, this situation can be
translated to consumer-tiering, and while application providers act as end-users, this
corresponds to access-tiering.
27 D. Isenberg and D. Weinberger in an on-line article “The Paradox of the Best Network” from 2004,
accessible at http://netparadox.com/.
28 “Now what [Google, MSN, Vonage and others] would like to do is use my pipes for free, but I ain’t
going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So there’s
going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion they’re
using.” R.O.Crockett, “Online Extra: At SBC, It’s All about Scale and Scope,” November 7, 2005,
interview with Ed Whitacre, http://www.businessweek.com/@@n34h*IUQu7KtOwgA/magazine/content/
05_45/b3958092.htm.
29 V. Vittore, “Cable flying under net neutrality radar,” Telephony Online, March 6, 2006, about cable
companies, http://telephonyonline.com/mag/telecom_cable_flying_net/; D. Searcy and A. Schatz, “Phone
Companies Set Off a Battle Over Internet Fees,” Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2006, about Verizon,
http://www.freepress.net/news/13218; BellSouth about net neutrality, April 3, 2006, http://slashdot.org/
article.pl?sid=06/03/06/003204; Joseph Waz, Keynote Remarks, Broadband Policy Summit, Washington,
D.C., May 10, 2006 http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=357; J. Sherman, “Expanded Alliance
Makes BellSouth DSL Service Available to DirecTV Subs”, February 14, 2006, about DSL-satellite deals,
http://www.tvweek.com/news.cms?newsId=9390.
30 Let us note that the authors explain their view about vertical leverage in a monopoly setup.
170 V. Kocsis, P.W. J. de Bijl
Stennek (2007) also argues that network operators are interested in exclusive
deals with application providers in the comparable applications market when the
quality of services can be increased.31
Based on this argument, we assume that network operators intend to
decommoditize their infrastructure by selling priorities and making exclusive deals
at the same time.
3.2 Benchmark case
In the current situation of network neutrality, services and applications are provided
in a non-discriminative manner. By buying Internet access, consumers can use or
purchase all available services, applications and content (as it is illustrated in Fig. 1).
In addition, they can develop applications themselves (not depicted in the figure).
Therefore the market outcome is as if consumers are able to contract directly with
application or service providers. In terms of variety and prices of services, it does not
matter for consumers with which network operator they deal; it is as if the market is
homogeneous at the networks level.
Note that the Internet’s current structure has created many opportunities for start-
ups to enter the services and applications market thus providing numerous valuable
options for consumers. Firms such as eBay, Google and Yahoo have grown
enormously and are now very prominent players. As we discussed in Section 3.1, we
can observe application-level innovations and investments continuing to occur at the
edges. Moreover, there is effective facilities-based competition between network
operators, and we assume that there is no wasteful duplication of investments in
networks. Therefore our starting point or benchmark situation seems to be
characterized by relatively high static as well as high dynamic efficiency.
3.3 Port blocking and quality degradation
To dive into the potential practices that may harm network neutrality, let us first look
at port blocking and quality degradation, as depicted in Fig. 3. We start with
considering the incentives for blocking and quality degradation and their potential
consequences in a competitive network market, then we assess whether network
operators have incentives to continue to discriminate in this way in the long run and
finally we derive policy implications.
Van Schewick (2007) provides an extensive argument about the existing
incentives to block or degrade the quality of lanes, even in the case of a network
duopoly. The network operator has an incentive to discriminate when it provides or
sponsors a service that competes directly with the blocked site (e.g. fixed telephony
vs. VoIP). The network operator has incentives to capture more revenues from its
31 This kind of price discrimination can be observed in the cable television market, when different cable
companies offer packages with different sets of television programs. The causes will be explained more
detailed in Section 3.4.
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own end-user services32 and also more outside revenues, for instance from
advertisements due to the two-sided nature of the Internet market. By blocking the
competing service or degrading the quality of lanes used by that particular service,
the network operator’s customers will use its own service, resulting in a monopoly
position over its customer basis and at the same time in a more stable market share.
Due to the first effect, the network operator may increase its prices, and so its
revenue captured in the market for services and applications. The second effect that
is the stable market share and the relating positive network externalities33 help the
firm to attract more advertisers, thus increasing its outside revenues.
In the absence of sufficient (facilities-based) competition, blocking and quality
degradation can be seen as an effective anticompetitive practice, which typically
reduces static and dynamic efficiency. Application developers may easily lose
incentives to innovate and invest by the threat of being blocked, since they can drop
out of the market without having the opportunity to recoup their investments.
Blocking therefore decreases dynamic efficiency in applications and services
markets. As for the networks level, the above mentioned sources may give enough
incentives for network operators to invest, thus increasing dynamic efficiency. This
effect can be illustrated as an upward shift of the inverted U-shaped curved (see in
Fig. 4 with dashed line).
On the other hand, network operators may become “lazy monopolists” in the
achieved market position—that is moving leftwards on the inverted U-shaped curve—
and cease to invest, resulting in decreased dynamic efficiency.
One may ask whether in case of sufficient facilities-based competition, a network
operator is able to maintain blocking in the longer term. Indeed, customers can walk
Operator 1 Operator 2 
voice Internet TV voice Internet TV 
voice 
X 
Fig. 3 Port blocking and quality degradation by operator 1
32 Sappington and Weisman (2005) and Mandy and Sappington (2004) present the incentives for
increasing network costs and degrading application quality in a monopoly market with vertically
integrated firm. Mandy and Sappington also show that quality degradation may lead to increasing profit if
quality matters for consumers, but to decreasing demand, prices and profit if consumers make their
decision according only to price.
33 Positive network externalities exist when a consumer’s utility increases with an increase in the total
number of consumers using the same product or service.
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away and choose another network if they are unhappy with the practice they face. If
operator 1 blocks a service or degrades the quality of a line, then another network,
say operator 2, may have an incentive not to block it since by providing more
product variety or better quality, operator 2 can differentiate itself from operator 1.
As a result of differentiation, consumers are willing to pay more and if switching can
be executed easily, operator 2 can increase its market share and its internal and
external revenue. Therefore operator 1 may reconsider its blocking strategy.
If blocking and deliberate quality degradation occur, general competition law
should be able to deal with it, as it can be seen in practice (e.g. Madison River
case). However, the effectiveness of ex post intervention crucially depends on the
effectiveness of monitoring, detection and punishment. Also, existing policy tools
such as facilitating wholesale broadband access, securing easy switch for
consumers or requiring interoperability may be sufficient to prevent these anti-
competitive practices, under which a network operator cannot maintain its market
power without losing too much of its market share. If above mentioned policy tools
fail to prevent or handle these types of practices, then ex ante regulation may be
desirable. In theory, the ultimate tool to eliminate them is vertical separation of




Addressing access-tiering is much less straightforward than the case of port
blocking, as we will see below. Our starting point is the recognition that network
operators are continuously facing the pressure that their networks are commoditized,
selling capacity without any distinguishing functionality, and leaving them with
eroded profit margins (see argument in Section 3.1). As we discussed there, to
counteract this pressure, operators basically have two options: (1) to add “flavors” to
their services, for instance through QoS-like functionality; and (2) to become









Fig. 4 Change in dynamic efficiency at the networks
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providers and end-users. Access-tiering provides the possibilities to do both.
Therefore, the potential effects of access-tiering are twofold (depicted in Fig. 5):
1 Horizontal effect: due to making exclusive deals with application providers,
network operators can distinguish themselves from one another. The result is
horizontal differentiation, which allows operators to increase market power and
hence mark-ups.34,35
2 Vertical effect: given the bargaining power arising from their “gatekeeper” role,
network operators can try to extract surplus from application and service
providers. Note that this power may be less if there is more intense competition
between networks, as application and service providers then have more effective
choice for a certain quality.
According to Fig. 5, access-tiering may reduce the intensity of competition
between the networks, since the networks try to create market niches. This will work
to the extent that application providers 1 and 2 (think e.g. of two IPTV service
providers, one broadcasting sport programs, the other movies) are seen as
differentiated offerings by consumers.
Arguably, this situation is more likely if there is a smaller number of competing
networks. The reason is that with a larger number of competing networks, operators
will have a harder time to differentiate themselves from one another. So, if there is a
duopoly at the networks level—only two networks—then horizontal differentiation
strategies may be rather effective.
In the following steps, we will discuss how access-tiering—by horizontal and
vertical effects—may affect static and dynamic efficiency levels compared to the
benchmark case.
3.4.2 Effects on static and dynamic efficiency
Access-tiering leads to horizontal differentiation (the horizontal effect), and therefore
to a reduction in the intensity of competition. The networks market is subject to
natural entry barriers such as economies of scale and sunk costs. Hence existing
network operators are not immediately threatened by entry if they reduce the
intensity of competition through horizontal differentiation. Therefore at the networks
level it leads to higher prices for broadband access.
As horizontal differentiation takes place, consumer choice in the applications
market is likely to be curtailed since consumers will face less variety of existing (or
comparable) services. Originally they had access to all content on each network
under the same conditions, whereas in the new situation the choice for a network
may imply constrained access to some types of content. Another potential
consequence of exclusive dealing is when an application provider starts to shift
the burden of the cost of its deals to consumers, thus charging prices for previously
34 Let us note that this problem has to be distinguished to the general horizontal differentiation where
consumers have a priori preferences over a particular service or product (e.g. red cars versus black cars).
The current type of differentiation is artificially generated by the network operators.
35 As in a Hotelling model (see Tirole 1988).
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free services. However as participants of the network neutrality discussion claim, if the
current subscriber-based business model of electronic communications market is replaced
by an advertiser-based model, this later problem will be less likely to happen. Finally, not
being able to engage in exclusive deals, start-ups may stay outside the market, or
companies with small market share may either easily drop out or be forced to merge with
larger application providers which leads to higher market concentration. By acquiring
smaller firms larger companies can assure or even increase their market power which in
case of paying applications and services might lead to higher prices on that market.
For all these reasons we claim that in the presence of access-tiering and exclusive
deals, static efficiency will be reduced.
The effect on dynamic efficiency at the networks level, due to the horizontal and
vertical effects, is not clear cut. As we assumed in Section 3.1, the relationship
between competition and dynamic efficiency is increasing (see Fig. 2), and this
figure can be used to illustrate the effects of access-tiering on long-run welfare. The
horizontal effect (differentiation) gives the networks more market power. Hence,
horizontal differentiation can be illustrated as a downward move in the inverse
U-shaped curve, thus resulting in lower dynamic efficiency (illustrated in Fig. 4).
By capturing rents (the vertical effect), networks make more profits which could
be used for additional investments. Note also that due to mandatory unbundling, a
fringe of DSL entrants without networks imposes intense competition on network
operators; product differentiation might then be useful to restore the returns on
investment for network operators.36 The vertical effect can be translated as the
inverted U-shaped curve shifts upwards, meaning increasing dynamic efficiency at a
certain level of competition. Whether the new market outcome, which is depicted by
the grey dot in Fig. 4, reflects to higher or lower overall effect on dynamic efficiency
at the networks level depends on how these two opposite effects compare to each
other. Policy makers will have to assess the magnitude of these effects.
The effect on dynamic efficiency at the services and applications level can be
separated into on the one hand, new innovations that have originated from end-users
at the edges, and on the other hand, improvements and imitations of already existing
services, possibly carried out by network operators.










Fig. 5 Access-tiering leading to product differentiation and rent capturing
36 See Ford et al. (2006).
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According to our first assumption in Section 3.1, access-tiering is undesirable for
dynamic efficiency since developers of the radically new applications—at the edges—
will most likely not be able to enter exclusive deals for receiving priorities. At least,
this may be the case when the commercial value of such innovations has not yet been
established. Having degraded priority, they face higher risk of achieving too little
critical mass in their customer base to successfully enter the market. The lack of
innovation at the edges might be more pronounced in case of high quality applications
and services, such as voice and video. As we claimed in assumption 1, innovation at
the edges has a preference since it displays higher share within overall innovations at
the applications level and carries higher value for dynamic efficiency. If there is a lack
of radically new innovations, dynamic efficiency will be strongly harmed.
To provide a complete view on how access-tiering affects dynamic efficiency, we
also have to consider the adoption of existing innovations (that were originally
developed by end-users and small start-ups) by big firms. This market shows a more
competitive characteristic with the participation of bigger application providers and
network owners. In the market of these services, companies may enter exclusive deals
with network operators, buying priorities for their services. Those application and
service providers which get priorities may gain a larger and, because of product
differentiation, more stable market share, and as a consequence higher external
revenues. According to Stennek (2007), under specific conditions these external
revenues may give application providers stronger incentives to invest in higher quality
of services. He argues that with higher quality applications, providers are able to
increase their market share which makes their products more attractive to advertisers.
As it can already be seen, advertising revenues are becoming more relevant leading to
the change of business models in the electronic communications market.
Let us make some additional comments, relating to the complementary relation
between networks and applications. Innovation in applications and services increases
the demand for Internet access and vice versa. Therefore in case of separate
providers, not all the positive effects arising from investments can be obtained by the
investor. As a result of these externalities, the firms in both levels will have fewer
incentives to invest than the social optimal level.37 When investments at both the
networks and applications level are brought about by the same (vertically integrated)
firm, these externalities can be internalized leading to the social optimal level of
investment and therefore increasing the incentives of network operators to invest.
3.4.3 Scenarios and the level of intervention
From the discussion above, we can generally conclude that access-tiering reduces
static efficiency. We will now consider three scenarios according to whether the
overall dynamic efficiency—in the applications and networks levels—gets higher
(−) or lower (+) as a result of access-tiering, or the overall effect is negligible (0).
See Table 1. In this table, we “calculate” overall welfare by aggregating static and
dynamic efficiency under the assumption that dynamic efficiency (which has a long
time horizon) gets a substantially larger weight than static efficiency.
37 See van Schewick (2007) p. 388–389 and Farrell and Weiser (2003).
176 V. Kocsis, P.W. J. de Bijl
In scenario 1, although static efficiency may be reduced as consumers’ choices
are reduced, increased market power for networks is assumed to have a positive
effect on dynamic efficiency. Overall, policy makers need not worry about access-
tiering, as the short-term negative effects are likely to be small compared to the long-
term positive effect, and therefore they can use a “hands-off” policy. Nevertheless
the regulator should remain alert that as a result of exclusive dealings, the reduction
of variety and transparency should not become too problematic.
In scenario 2, the overall effect of access-tiering on long-term welfare is
negligible. Nevertheless static efficiency gets lower, thus decreasing short-term
welfare. Therefore the regulator may opt for using policy tools which spur the
competition at the networks level (e.g. by stimulating facilities-based competition, or
possibly mandating network unbundling). Then network operators have less long
term incentives to discriminate unduly without losing their market shares.
In scenario 3, static efficiency is reduced and increased market power for
networks is assumed to have a negative effect on dynamic efficiency. In this
scenario, policy makers should try to prevent access-tiering, as it substantially
reduces welfare. Interventions may range from specific access-tiering regulation (e.g.
requiring non-discriminating offers for a certain priority, interoperability or minimal
quality of service) to imposing network neutrality. Of course, the cost of such
interventions, such as the cost of regulation and the risk of regulatory failure, has to
be assessed before one can decide on the optimal type of intervention.
According to Wallsten (2006), not many empirical studies have shown how a
regulatory intervention achieved its goal. The literature is mainly relating to
mandated unbundling which we will cover in the following chapter. Other
government policies which mainly aimed at helping connect more people to the
Internet were more successful if they have subsidized public places such as schools
or libraries, or encouraged investments in rural areas.
Those regulatory tools which require special standards to increase the universality
and the openness of the Internet so far have contributed to the dynamic growth of the
Internet including investments in both levels (see Berners-Lee 2007). The scope of
these tools can be extended in a straightforward manner by requirements on
interoperability or minimal quality of services.
Finally, as we have already mentioned in the introduction imposing rules to
maintain network neutrality is likely to facilitate innovations at the edges, but it
might decrease incentives to invest in and upgrade networks. At this stage, it is hard
to assess whether the benefits outweighs the costs.
Table 1 The aggregate welfare effects of access-tiering, decomposed into static and dynamic welfare
Effect of access-tiering on dynamic efficiency
(+) (0) (−)









effect: − but small)
Access-tiering is strongly
undesirable (overall effect: −
and large)
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3.5 Can more intensive competition between networks mitigate the negative
consequences of discriminative practices?
To answer this question, we draw up two potential solutions: first we assume that
service-based competition intensified by regulatory intervention such as mandated
access, takes place in the networks level; in the second case we assume a market-
based response where one of the application providers has an incentive to build up
its own network and therefore intensify facilities-based competition.
3.5.1 Access-tiering and regulating access to networks
In addition to interventions aiming at restoring a degree of network neutrality, it may
also be desirable to spur competition between networks. This is particularly so if
competition between networks is reduced to the detriment of short-term interest of
consumers. Then low static efficiency can be increased by approaching more intense
competition using existing regulatory tools as mandated access to networks.
Accordingly, new competition is introduced, which may alleviate the softening in
competition that was caused by product differentiation (see Fig. 6).
Of course, regulators should prevent that competition becomes too intense, which
could easily revert the relationship between competition and dynamic efficiency
(right-hand side of the U-shaped curve in Fig. 2).
In the context of access regulation, it is interesting to comment on the situation for
instance in The Netherlands, where the DSL network operator, because of its
dominant position, faces access obligations. The various regional cable operators,
based on the EU regulation do not have to provide access to entrants. As a result,
besides that there is a duopoly in networks in each region, the competitive landscape
is characterized by a variety of DSL entrants without their own networks. Their
primary service is broadband Internet access, but some also offer digital television or
VoIP telephony. Without the fringe of DSL entrants, there would just be a duopoly,
so that, as was observed above, access-tiering can be expected to be an effective
means of horizontal product differentiation, leading to softening of competition and
reduced transparency for end-users. The overall effect would be a decrease in static
efficiency. Perhaps the presence of DSL entrants counteracts this welfare reduction:
consumers have more choice and alternatives, if they do not like the offerings based
on priorities and discrimination offered by the network operators. Thus, in the light
of the potentially negative effects of access-tiering on static efficiency, it may be
worthwhile to stick to regulated access.38
However some empirical and case studies showed that mandated access has not
necessarily affected broadband penetration and investment decisions in a positive
way. Hausman and Sidak (2005), in their empirical research about the USA, the UK,
New Zealand, Canada and Germany, show that companies with unbundling
requirement expected lower returns to investments. Moreover, entrants have not
corresponded to the ‘stepping-stone’ theory meant to intensify service-based
competition first and by that in the next step give incentives to invest in their own
38 In this discussion, we abstract from the asymmetry of access regulation between the DSL incumbent
and the cable operators. We also abstract from the effect of access regulation on dynamic efficiency.
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network. As Denni and Gruber (2005) found in their analysis about the DSL market
in the USA, service-based competition has initially increased broadband adoption,
however this effect disappeared over time.
Wallsten (2006), analyzing different types of unbundling (local loop or subloop
unbundling, and on-site collocation) derives similar conclusions, and though
collocation not necessarily decreases broadband penetration, it does so if the
collocation charge is regulated. On the other hand, lack of regulation (as e.g. shown
in Crandall (2005) examining the broadband market in Korea and Canada) or ended
regulations (e.g. Hazlett (2006) about DSL market in the USA) increased investments
also in roll-outs.
Theoretical papers also discuss the effect of regulation on market outcomes. Let
us emphasize one relating to mandated access. Farrell and Weiser (2003) claim that
regulated access fee may give incentives for a network operator to make further
exclusive deals with application providers, since it can compensate for the fact that
its infrastructure is used at a price lower than the profit maximizing level.
To conclude, although mandated access may intensify service-based competition
thus increasing static efficiency, the regulator has to keep in mind that it may also lead to
lack of incentives to invest at the networks level, which decreases dynamic efficiency.
3.5.2 Application providers building their own networks
In response to port blocking, quality degradation and access-tiering, applications and
service providers may want to reduce their dependence on network operators.
Perhaps the most effective way to do so for a service operator is to roll out its own
network (see Fig. 7).39
DSL network Cable network
 














Fig. 6 Access regulation aiming at increasing service-based competition
39 For instance in September, 2005, Google announced to build up a free WiFi local network in San
Francisco; see: http://gigaom.com/2005/09/30/google-confirms-san-francisco-wifi-plans/. As a first step, it
has installed and been managing a municipal WiFi network in its hometown of Mountain View, California
since August 2006. In the meantime, Google agreed with the DSL entrant Earthlink to install the network
in SF, but the realization is obscured by the discussion in the municipalities whether a privately owned or a
city-owned network is the proper solution (see http://www.localtechwire.com/business/local_tech_wire/
opinion/story/1210597/). As a reaction, another company, the Meraki Networks decided to establish its
own WiFi network in the same region (see http://www.wirelessweek.com/article/CA6421866.html).
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If this happens, it is the market that finds a solution to practices that undermine
network neutrality. As a result, facilities-based competition will become more intense,
while the variety of services for consumers will remain intact. However, because of
network duplication, static efficiency may be reduced. Overall, it is therefore uncertain
whether such a market-based response is better for welfare than policy intervention.
4 Conclusion and preliminary policy recommendations
Although end-users buy access to the Internet and get indirect access to applications
and services, the Internet currently functions in a more or less neutral way, as if
consumers contract directly with application and service providers, without the
interference of network operators. However, emerging technologies enable network
providers to attach priorities to, and discriminate between, services and applications,
possibly dependent on the value that end-users derive from them. By doing so, they
may distinguish themselves from other networks (horizontal differentiation), and
also capture rents from application and service providers. An important question is
whether, given that there is facilities-based competition at the level of networks, such
discriminatory practices may harm welfare.
In this paper, we considered the discriminating practices known as port blocking
or deliberate quality degradation, and access-tiering. If facilities-based competition is
sufficiently intense, port blockers will lose customers quickly to other networks, and
there will be sufficient discipline. If there is a lack of competition at the networks
level, port blocking and quality degradation are typically bad for welfare, and should
be discouraged by antitrust policy. If facilities-based competition is sufficient, a
network operator may back out of using blocking because of the potential loss in its
market share. Nonetheless, if anticompetitive practices take place and the ex post
intervention is not effective, for instance because such practices are difficult to
detect, ex ante regulation may be desirable, say through technical requirements on
network traffic. Further research is necessary to assess whether policy makers should
worry about port blocking and quality degradation. In any case, it does not seem a





Fig. 7 Service provider building its own network
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safe strategy to bet on the good intentions of network operators or on the lack of
technologies to implement such practices.
Access-tiering is more difficult to assess from a welfare perspective. First of all, it
can be expected to soften competition between networks and to reduce variety and
transparency for consumers, both of which are bad for static efficiency. In addition, it
can increase network operators’ bargaining power with regard to developers of
applications and services. The increase in market power that results from these
horizontal and vertical effects, might improve the incentives of networks to invest
and innovate. If that is the case, a hands-off approach can suffice. On the other hand,
if the increase in network operators’ market power which is due to access-tiering
reduces their incentives to invest and innovate, and also withhold the development
on innovations at the edges, policy makers should step in. Similarly, if long-term
welfare effects are negligible, access-tiering will yet harm short-term welfare, calling
for policy intervention.
A variety of policy tools can be imagined ranging from “hands-off” policy (let the
market take care of the situation), through a minimal type of intervention
(interoperability or minimal quality of services), to more specific interventions (for
instance regulation aiming specifically at access-tiering, or more drastically,
imposing network neutrality through regulation). Our paper suggests that doing-
nothing policy might be risky because of the potential welfare loss. On the other
hand, specific intervention may create heavy burden on market players, and since at
this stage of the research the real welfare loss cannot be exactly assessed, the risk of
regulatory failure may be large. An intermediary type of solution (minimal
intervention), could be relying on interoperability requirements, in which, compared
to the option of doing nothing, the operators face minimal obligations, while
applications and services providers do not have to carry the burden of proof if things
go wrong from their perspective. This solution includes little regulatory costs, does
not require additional information, and bears little risk of regulatory failure or
distorting market incentives. Despite some experience with interoperability in
telephony, more analysis is needed to assess how effective and efficient
interoperability can be.
If there is sufficient competition between networks, then access-tiering, assuming
it reduces dynamic efficiency, may be somewhat less harmful, as consumers can
switch to other networks. However, it is unclear exactly when there is sufficient
competition between networks. With only two networks (e.g. DSL and cable), the
effect of access-tiering may simply be that competition is softened while consumers
have a harder time in matching their preferences to the portfolios offered by the
networks. The larger the number of networks, the less this is likely to happen. Thus,
if alternative networks, such as FTTH, UMTS and WiFi local networks, offer
sufficient outside possibilities for a large enough subset of consumers, the welfare
harms need not be substantial. The same can be said if, because of regulated access,
there is a fringe of DSL entrants (other ISPs) that impose competitive discipline on
the network operators. On the other hand, if alternative networks do not play a
significant role and if there are no DSL entrants, so that effectively there are a very
small number of network operators, then access-tiering may hurt both consumers and
the developers of applications and services.
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Let us finally relate the remarks on competing networks to our example of the
situation in the Netherlands, which has the second largest broadband penetration in
the world. Both the incumbent telecoms operator and various regional cable
operators are now able to offer triple play bundles, not to mention regulation of local
loop unbundling allowing for DSL entrants who use the incumbent’s network. Given
that alternative networks such as FTTH do not yet play a significant role, within
network owners there is a duopoly situation and in the networks level as a whole
there are a few more market players. Access-tiering can then be expected to lead to
horizontal differentiation between networks, and hence to softening of competition.
In addition, it will help networks to capture rents from developers of applications
and services. Provided that content providers rather than networks that drive
innovation, along the lines of the arguments set out in this paper, access-tiering may
call for policy intervention. In particular, under the hypothesis that access-tiering
reduces dynamic efficiency, the number of competing networks in The Netherlands
may simply be too small to alleviate the negative welfare effect of access-tiering.
Furthermore, we argued that the presence of DSL entrants may counteract the
reduction of static welfare caused by access-tiering, as it gives consumers more
choices and alternatives, if they do not like the offerings based on priorities and
discrimination offered by the network operators. However, we have not addressed
whether the presence of such a competitive fringe can also alleviate the reduction in
dynamic efficiency.
To conclude, let us mention that at this stage, we aimed to raise the most
important insights relating to discriminating practices in the Internet and derive some
preliminary conclusions and policy recommendations. However, the analysis should
be deepened by using economic models that can lay bare the effects of access-tiering
on the incentives of network operators and content providers to innovate and to
invest.
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